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THE RULEMAKING POWER OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT:
THE TWILIGHT ZONE BETWEEN SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
The limits of procedural and substantive law have not been defined
and no two would agree where the one leaves off and the other begins.
Chief Justice Terrell, speaking for the Supreme Court of Florida
in Petition of FloridaState Bar Association'
-

Pursuant to constitutional mandate the Florida supreme court establishes rules regulating practice and procedure in all Florida courts. 2 Since the
scope of this edict has not been adequately explored it presents several perplexing problems. 4 The initial problem is the difficult task of determining
the confines of practice and procedure, 5 and thereby the limits of judicial
rulemaking. The prevalent view suggests a broad "twilight zone" in which
procedural and substantive law are virtually indistinguishable,6 thereby presenting the more fundamental problem of allocating authority in the gray
areas 7 between the legislative and judicial branches of government.8
The problem of delineating legislative and judicial authority is especially difficult in Florida, since the Florida supreme court enjoys one of
the broadest rulemaking grants in the nation. 9 Adding to the uncertainty
surrounding the court's rulemaking authority is the concurrent and sometimes overlapping work of legislative and judicial agencies implementing the
American Bar Association's Standards for the Administration of Criminal
Justice.10 Several areas dealt with by the ABA Standards fall within the sha-

1. 145 Fla. 22,228 199 So. 57,59 (1940).
2. "The practice and procedure in all courts shall be governed by rules adopted by
the supreme court." FLA. CoNsr. art. V, §3. See Barton v. State, 193 So. 2d 618, 626 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
8. See 26 FLA. STAT. ANN. 170 (commentary).

4. Nash, Florida Appeal Times, 16 U. MAMx L. REv. 24, 40 (1961).
5. See State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1969).
6. Curd, Substance and Procedure in Rule Making, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 34 (1948).
7. In re Wartman's Estate, 128 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. 1961).
8. Ft& CoNsr. art. 11, §3 provides: "The powers of the state government shall be
divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one

branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein."
9. See Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem

in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 6-9 &n.36 (1958).
10. See Ervin, ABA Standards Give Accused Lawful Rights; Assure Public of Speedy
Enforcement, 44 FiA. B.J. 20 (1970). Florida is one of three pilot states selected to implement the ABA Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice [hereinafter cited as ABA
Standards]. ABA Criminal Law Section, Progress Report of Section on Criminal Law in
Connection with Its Responsibility for Implementation of ABA Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice, 8 Am. Cmm. L.Q. 178 (1970). See text accompanying notes 122126 infra for a discussion of the agencies involved in Florida's implementation of the

ABA Standards.
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cedural realm of the court.
This note will examine the evolution of judicial rulemaking in Florida,
rationales supporting delineations of the Florida supreme court's rulemaking
power, and the legislative role, if any, in regulating practice and procedure.
Because implementation of the ABA Standards appears imminent, criminal
procedure is emphasized. Alternative rationales defining procedure and a proposed mechanism for the reduction of the possibility of legislative-judicial
rulemaking friction are the focal point of the discussion.
THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL RULEMAKING

A court rule is essentially a judicial order directed against all persons
within its scope, and like a statute is prospective and must be promulgated
or published to be effective. 12 Rules of court are deeply rooted in English
common law pleadings13 developed primarily in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. By eliminating technicalities14 and making a trial an orderly
search for the truth,1 5 modern rules of procedure are intended to simplify
the administration of justice.
Prior to the "Great Debate" over procedural reformr 6 in the 1920's and
1930's, the scope of judicial rulemaking was generally limited to administrative matters such as contempt,1'

18

administration of the bar,

and regulation

11. Interview with Gerald T. Bennett, Secretary, Florida Supreme Court Committee
To Revise the Rules of Criminal Procedure in Light of the ABA Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice [hereinafter cited as the Implementation Committee], in
Gainesville, Fla., Jan. 26, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Bennett Interview].
12. Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court Affecting Procedure, 22 WASH.
U.L.Q. 459, 466 (1937).
13. Winters, The National Movement Toward Legal and Judicial Reform, 13 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 33, 44 (1968). See generally Tyler, The Origin of the Rule-Making Power and Its
Exercise By Legislatures, 22 A.B.A.J. 772 (1936). For a discussion of rulemaking as exercised by the English Bench see S. ROSENBAUM, THE RULE-MAKING AUTHoRITY IN THE
ENGLISH SUPREME COURT (1917). See Pound, The Rule Making Power of the Courts, 12
A.B.A.J. 599, 601 (1926).
14. Wincor v. Turner, 215 So. 2d 3, 6 (Fla. 1968).
15. Winters, supra note 13.
16. The "Great Debate" consisted of discussions over the relative merits of legislative
versus judicial control over procedure. E.g., Cummings, Extending the Rule-Making Power
to Federal Criminal Procedure, 22 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 151 (1938); Pound, supra note 13.
Examples of the Florida corollary of the procedural reform debate may be found in
Anderson, The Rule Making Power of the Courts, 2 FLA. B.J., May 1928, at 6; Andrews,
Fundamentals of Rule Making Power of Courts, 2 FLA. B.J., April 1929, at 3; Bedell,
Proposed Adoption of New Federal Procedure for Florida Courts, 12 FLA. B.J. 303 (1938);
Watson, Memorandum on the Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule-Making Statute, 2
FLA. B.J., April 1929, at 15.
17. E.g., Little v. State, 90 Ind. 338 (1883); Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 45 N.E. 199
(1896).
18. Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 145 Fla. 223, 199 So. 57 (1940); In re Day, 181
Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899). But see Petition of Jacksonville Bar Ass'n, 125 Fla. 175, 169
So. 674 (1936) (legislature exercises concurrent jurisdiction under inherent powers).
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of court business. 19 Such matters were considered within the inherent power
of the courts by virtue of the constitutional separation of powers.- During
this period legislative control over all but administrative aspects of court
21
procedure was the accepted norm.
22
comThe movement away from legislative control over procedure
23
menced with federal reforms in the 1980's.
Adopting the federal model,24
a majority of states delegated rulemaking authority to the courts.25 These
enabling acts extended rulemaking beyond merely administrative matters,
28
but as legislative grants, subjected court rules to legislative veto.

19. See, e.g., Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 145 Fla. 223, 199 So. 57 (1940); Petition
of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 184 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280 (1938). Accord, State ex rel. Gerst Bros.
Mfg. Co. v. Ossing, 222 Mo. App. 448, 7 S.W.2d 428 (1928); Brown v. Mossop, 139 Ohio St.
24, 37 N.E.2d 598 (1941).
20. E.g., Burney v. Lee, 59 Ariz. 360, 129 P.2d 308 (1942); Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo.
8, 33, 300 P. 575, 584 (1931); Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 145 Fla. 223, 226, 199 So.

57, 58 (1940).
21. Winters, supra note 13, at 48. The general acceptance of legislative control over
judicial procedure has been attributed to the superior prestige of the legislative branch in
the 19th century, the conservatism of the American legal profession in following English
practices long after they had been abandoned by the English, the relative ease of statutory
enactment, and judicial reluctance to expand inherent powers. Curd, Substance and Procedure in Rule Making, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 34, 38 (1948); Pound, supra note 13, at 599-601.
22. Sixteen states still control judicial procedure primarily through legislation: Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New York,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Vermont. See 1 W.
BARRON & A. HourzorF, FEDERAL PRACrIcE AND PROCEDURE §9 (Supp. 1970).
23. The United States Supreme Court, through congressional grant, was empowered to
promulgate civil rules of procedure in 1934. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§l, 2, 48 Stat.
1064. In the criminal area the Court was authorized to promulgate rules after the verdict in
1933. Act of Feb. 24, 1933, ch. 119, 47 Stat. 904. The Court obtained criminal rulemaking
power prior to the verdict in 1940. Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688. For present
day codifications of these statutes, as subsequently amended and refined, see 28 U.S.C. §2072
(Supp. V 1965-1969) (civil procedure); 18 U.S.C. §3772 (1964) (criminal procedure after
verdict); 18 U.S.C. §3771 (Supp. V, 1965-1969) (criminal procerure prior to and including

verdict).
24. For the history of state acceptance of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure see
Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 435 (1958). Seven jurisdictions have adopted the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure substantially in toto: Alaska,

Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey. Other jurisdictions, including
Florida, have utilized portions of the Federal Rules. Winters, supra note 13, at 44 n.29.
25. Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making,
55 U. MicH. L. R1v. 623, 625 (1957). For a collection of cases from 33 states see Annot. 110
A.L.R. 28 (1937). See also Annot., 158 A.L.R. 707 (1945). Twenty-eight states presently have
enabling acts, although in some cases the legislative grant is restrictive or not utilized:
Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, Wyoming, and Wisconsin. See 1 W. BARRON & A. HoLTzorr, supra note 22,

§9.
26. "[W]hat the legislature has granted it may likewise take away." Hall, Judicial RuleMaking Is Alive but Ailing, 55 A.B.A.J. 637, 639 (1969).
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Basically, Florida followed the national pattern of rulemaking reform,
but a decided judicial reluctance to exercise existing rulemaking powers27
resulted in what has been termed a "checkered history" of procedural reform. 28 Modem rules of civil procedure, abolishing the distinction between
law and equity, were not adopted by the Florida supreme court until 1967,29
eleven years after its investiture with constitutional rulemaking authority. 3o
The court's entrance into criminal rulemaking l was the response to the
2
United States Supreme Court's directive in Gideon v. Wainwright.3 Criminal Rule 1 was adopted to avoid chaos by regulating the administration of
post-conviction relief proceedings of indigent defendants, which Gideon
held had been denied the right to appointed counsel. 33 The first comprehensive body of criminal rules was not implemented in Florida until 1968.34
Since most were patterned after existing procedural statutes,3 5 they did not
represent an aggressive or innovative assertion of the court's authority.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE To GOVERN PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

The Florida supreme court's reluctance to exercise its rulemaking power
sharply contrasts with the "uncontrollable"3 6 nature of that power. Of twelve
state constitutions authorizing some form of judicial rulemaking,7 only
27. In 1940 the Florida supreme court held its inherent powers did not encompass the
power to promulgate civil rules of procedure patterned after the federal rules. Petition of
Florida State Bar Ass'n, 145 Fla. 223, 199 So. 57 (1940). Despite intervening passage of an
enabling act, the court in 1945 again rejected an opportunity to promulgate civil rules
of procedure. Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 155 Fla. 710, 21 So. 2d 605 (1945) (not
wise or expedient to exercise power). Finally succumbing to pressure from the bar, the
court adopted civil rules in 1949 preserving the law and equity distinction. Fla. Common
Law and Equity Rules (1949); see Poe, Comments on the New Florida Rules, 24 FLA. B.J.
169 (1950). The court, still refusing to relinquish the law and equity distinction, adopted
a new set of civil rules in 1954. FLA. R. Civ. P. (1954); see Arnow & Brown, Florida's 1954
Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 125 (1954).
28. 1 W. BARON & A. HOLTZOFF, supra note 22, §9.10.

29. FLA. R. Crv. P. (1967).
30. FLA. CoNsr. art. V. §3 (adopted by general election Nov. 6, 1956).
31. The promulgation of civil rules of procedure had no effect upon criminal procedure.
E.g., Long v. State, 96 So. 2d 897, 898 (Fla. 1957); Farrior v. State, 76 So. 2d 148, 149 (Fla.
1954). Prior to the adoption of criminal rules, criminal procedure was primarily regulated
under a comprehensive statutory code enacted in 1939. See Criminal Procedure Act of 1939,
la. Laws 1939, ch. 19554, §§1-319.
32. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent's right to counsel).
33. In re Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1, 151 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1963). This rule was
patterned after 28 U.S.C. §2255 (1964). The present post-conviction relief rule is F.
R.
CaM. P. 1.850. For a discussion of the institution of Rule 1 see Barns & Alexander, Appellate Procedure, 20 U. MiAMI L. REv. 368 (1965).
34. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 196 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1967). See Datz,
Florida'sNew Rules of Criminal Procedure, 42 FLA. B.J. 285 (1968).
35. See Datz, supra note 34, at 285.
36. Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 6-9.
37. ALAs. CONST. art. IV, §15; ARiz. CONsr. art. VI, §5; CAL. CONsr. art. VI, §1(a)(5);
COLO. CONST. art. VI, §21; FLA. CONST. art. V, §3; HAWAII CONST. art. V, §6; MD. CONSr.
art. IV, §18A; MicH. CoNsr. art. VI, §5; Mo. CONSr. art. V, §5; Nm. CONsr. art. V, §25;
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those of Florida, Arizona, Hawaii, and Michigan fail to subject judicial
38
rulemaking to some degree of legislative control.
The latitude of the Florida constitution's rulemaking grant requires a
two-fold determination in defining the scope of judicial rulemaking. First,
the procedural or substantive character of the area in question must be defined.
Then, the nature and extent of the legislative role in regulating procedure
must be ascertained.3 9
Substantive Right Rationale
In attempting to distinguish procedure and substance, and thereby delineate the constitutional boundaries of rulemaking, the court has adopted
a substantive right rationale.40 Its foundation is that the separation of powers clauie41 implicitly prohibits rulemaking that abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right.42
The operation of the rationale is illustrated in State v. Garcia43 which
raised the issue of whether a defendant indicted for a capital offense could
waive a jury trial. The pertinent statute prohibited waiver where "a sentence of death may be imposed.""4 The conflicting rule, authorizing jury
trial waiver, did not limit the right in capital cases. 45 Finding that -the rule's
allowance of jury waiver did not abrogate or modify substantive law, the
Garcia court deemed the rule to be within the court's rulemaking powers.
Consequently, the statute was determined to have been superseded since it
conflicted with a "procedural" rule.46
The decision in State v. Furen47 demonstrates the converse operation of
the substantive right rationale. That case involved a conflict between a
statutory grant of an appeal as a matter of right"' and a court rule providing

N.J. CoNsr. art VI, §2, 113; Omo CONsr art. VI, §5 (b).
38. Compare ALAS. CoNsr. art. IV, §15 (rules may be changed by two-thirds vote of
both houses), with CAL. CONSr. art. VI, §1 (a) (5) (judicial role merely advisory) and CoLo.
CONsr. art. VI, §21 (general assembly shall have the power to provide simplified procedures in
county courts) and MD. CONST. art. IV, §18A (until rescinded, changed, or modified by law)
and Mo. CoNST. art. V, §5 (rule may not be in conflict with laws governing such matters)
and N.J. CoNsr. art. VI, §2,

8, (subject to law) and Omo CoNsr. art. IV, §5 (B) (rules

ineffective when general assembly adopts resolution of disapproval).
39. See Levin & Amsterdam, supranote 9, at 23.

40. Nash, supra note 4, at 42.
41. FiA. CONSr. art. II, §8.
42. State v. Furen, 118 So. 2d 6, 12 (Fla. 1960).

48. 229 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1969).
44. Ea. Laws 1939, ch. 19554 §181 (codified in Fla. Stat. §912.01 (1969), repealed, Fla.

Laws 1970, ch. 70-389, §180).
45. FL.A.R . CraM. P. 1.260.
46. State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236, 238-89 (Fla. 1969). For examples of other applications
of this rationale see State v. Robinson, 132 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 1961) (statute governing disqualification of a judge held procedural); Dade County v. Snowden, 153 So. 2d 37 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1963) (ordinance requiring court appearance held procedural).
47. 118 So. 2d 6 (Fla.1960).
48. Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 31182, §8(e).
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that all such appeals were to be by certiorari. 49 Labeling the right to review
a substantive matter, the court found the rule to be restrictive of a substantive right and therefore beyond the scope of practice and procedure. 50
The difficulty in utilizing the substantive right rationale to delineate
the extent of rulemaking is that it is based upon definitions that distinguish
procedure and substance. Although this distinction is a difficult task, numerous courts and commentators have nevertheless attempted to articulate it.51
The thrust of these efforts is that practice and procedure, treated as being
synonymous, 5 2 constitute the legal machinery by which substantive law is
effectuated, 53 while substantive law gives or defines a legal right.5 4 Moreover, criminal substantive law declares which acts are crimes and prescribes
the punishment therefor, while criminal procedure regulates the steps leading to punishment. 55
Despite the abundance of such efforts no definitive test is available.56
Except for clearly substantive matters such as jurisdiction 7 or distinctively
procedural areas such as the regulation of contempt, 58 existing definitions
are not useful and no more viable alternatives exist. 59
Because no specific definition can adequately segregate substance from
procedure, 60 the substantive right rationale is misleading; it dictates a blackwhite categorization of an area as substantive or procedural, ignoring the
fact that the substantive zone, into which judicial rulemaking may not extend, can be a relative concept 6 open to varying interpretations.62 Sub-

49.

Fr.A. App. R. 4.1.

50. State v. Furen, 118 So. 2d 6, 12 (Fla. 1960). Accord, State v. Birmingham, 95 Ariz.
310, 390 P.2d 103, aff'd on rehearing,96 Ariz. 109, 392 P.2d 775 (1964).
51. See, e.g., State v. Birmingham, 96 Ariz. 109, 110-11, 392 P.2d 775, 776 (1964) (collection of 17 cases attempting definition). For a compilation of formulas and definitions
see Curd, supra note 6. A few of the more elaborate definitions and subdefinitions border
on the metaphysical. E.g., Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HAav. L. Rav. 40, 42 (1918): "[Flor
legal purposes a right is only a hypostasis of a prophecy - the imagination of a substance
"
supporting the fact ....
52. See Nash, FloridaAppeal Times, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 24, 41 (1961).
53. Poyser v. Minors, 7 Q.B.D. 329, 331 (1881).
54. Id. The Poyser definitions of substance and procedure constitute the nucleus of
many judicial attempts to distinguish the two factors. Compare Industrial Comm'n v.
Cameron, 103 Ariz. 613, 615, 447 P.2d 871, 873 (1968), with State ex rel. Bror v. District
Court of Fourth Judicial Dist., 148 Mont. 22, 26, 417 F.2d 109, 110 (1966).
55. State v. Garda, 229 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1969). Accord, State v. Augustine, 107 Kan.
207, 416 P.2d 281 (1966).
56. Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem
in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. Rv. 1, 15 (1958).
57. See County of Dade v. Saffan, 173 So. 2d 138, 140-41 (Fla. 1965).
58. See, e.g., South Dade Farms v. Peters, 88 So. 2d 891, 897 (Fla. 1956); Seaboard Air
Line Ry. v. Tampa So. R.R., 101 Fla. 468, 474-75, 134 So. 529, 532 (1931).
59. Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 56, at 15.
60. Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya, 80 N.M. 107, 109, 452 P.2d 176, 178 (1969).
61. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 450

(1932).
62.

Nash, supra note 52, at 43.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss1/5

6

Earl: The Rulemaking Power of the Florida Supreme Court: The Twilight Z
1971]

FLORIDA SUPREME COURT RULEMAKING

POWER

. 93

stantive boundaries depend on the purposes for which the rule or statute
is applied s as well as variable public policy considerations. 4
In State ex rel. Uzelac v. Lake Criminal Court6 5 the Indiana supreme
court, defining its rulemaking powers, avoided the substance versus procedure
quagmire. The case involved a petition for discharge under a speedy trial
rule requiring an accused to be discharged if not tried within six months. 6
The state, terming the right to discharge a substantive matter, argued the
rule was not within the court's rulemaking power.6 7 But the court upheld
the nile's validity,68 holding that since the right to a speedy trial was guaranteed by the Indiana constitution,9 the constitution and not the rule had
created the right to discharge.7° The rule merely prescribed the methods by
71
which the constitutional right was enforced in judicial proceedings.
In circumventing the enigmatic substantive right terminology, the Indiana court frankly emphasized the ultimate power underlying its constitutional right rationale: the judiciary is the final arbiter of the constitutional
reasonableness of any legislative limitations on constitutional rights, with
the power to determine substantive law through precedent.7 2 Taking what
it deemed a realistic approach, however, the court declined to utilize precedent in an arbitrary or ex post facto manner. Instead, adoption of court
rules would outline, for the guidance of lower courts, what the court deemed
a
constitutionally reasonable7
The Florida supreme court has seemingly rejected all approaches other
than a literal definition of "practice" and "procedure."74 One consequence

63. The dynamic nature of "substance" is evidenced in the divergent contexts in which
the term is applied. See, e.g., RESrATEMENT OF CoNFucrs OF LAws §584 (1934) (substance
versus procedure in applying conflicts of laws); Green, Drafting Uniform Federal Rules of
Evidence, 52 ComamrNL.Q. 177, 204-08 (1967) (evidentiary matters); Grooms, Substantive or
Procedural?,27 ALA. LAW. 5 (1966) (federal jurisdiction).
64. Riedl, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-making Power Prescribe Rules
of Evidence?, 26 A.Ba.J. 601, 604 (1940).
65. 247 Ind. 87, 212 N.E2d 21 (1965).
66. IND. R. Cara. P. 1-4D.
67. Unlike the Florida supreme court's rulemaking powers, which are constitutionally
derived, the Indiana supreme court's powers emanate from a legislative enabling act.
IND. ANN. STAT. §2-4718 (1946).
68. State ex rel. Uzelac v. Lake Criminal Court, 247 Ind. 87, 91, 212 N.E.2d 21, 24 (1965).
69. Compare IND. CONsr. art. I, §12, with FLA. CoNsr. art. I, §16 (speedy trial provisions).
70. State v. Meek, 9 Ariz. App. 149, 450 P.2d 115, (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 847 (1969), evidences language not as restrained as that of the Uzelac court: "Our
Arizona Supreme Court . . .understood they were giving the defendant an absolute unqualified right." Id. at 153, 450 P.2d at 119 (emphasis added).
71. State ex rel. Uzelac v. Lake Criminal Court, 247 Ind. 87, 90-91, 212 N.E.2d 21, 22-23

(1965).
72. Id. at 91, 212 N.E.2d at 23. Courts necessarily make new substantive law through
the decision of specific cases coming before them. Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 248, 74
A.2d 406, 410, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950).
73. State ex rel. Uzelac v. Lake Criminal Court, 247 Ind. 87, 91, 212 N.E.2d 21, 23
(1965).
74. "[TMhe validity of [a rule] turns on the meaning of 'practice and procedure' in
relation to the courts." State v. Furen, 118 So. 2d 6, 11 (Fla. 1960).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1971

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 5

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIV

of retaining the substantive right approach- impossible on any rational
basiso- is continuing uncertainty over the scope of "practice and proce7
dure." 6
The Legislative Role in Regulating Procedure
Compounding uncertainties over the scope of procedure is the unsettled
issue with respect to the legislature's role in regulating procedure. Several
factors indicate that the legislature has no authority over judicial procedures: (1) court rules supersede conflicting legislative enactments; 7 7 (2) the
constitution provides no legislative procedural authority; (3) the legislature
has shown a marked deference to the court over procedural matters.78 Despite such indications, however, an appellate court has never held the Florida
9
supreme court's procedural authority to be exclusive7
The court's failure to regulate clearly procedural areas further obscures
the legislature's procedural role. For example, the Criminal Rules of Procedure entirely omit forms of practice. The procedural nature of these
forms is apparent; all other Florida procedural compilations and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure contain such forms.80 The supreme court, however, has left this area subject to legislative control.8'
Section 918.06 of the 1969 Florida Statutes is illustrative of other procedural areas not encompassed by court rule. This statute authorizes the discretionary separation, detention, and admonishment of jurors before submission of the cause. A related criminal rule limits itself to the discretionary
separation of jurors after submission of the cause. 2 Although committee
83
notes accompanying the rule indicate it was not derived from the statute,
adequate grounds exist for incorporating the statutory subject matter within
84
a court rule. Nevertheless, no such attempt has been made.
The court's failure to adopt rules governing these and other distinctly
procedural areas may be construed as tacit recognition that it does not ex75. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 56, at 14-15.

76. The relative nature of substance defies an orderly or predictable pattern of decisions
distinguishing between substance and procedure. Cook, supra note 61, at 335.
77. The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provide: "This compilation shall supersede all conflicting rules and statutes." In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 196 So.

124 (Fla. 1967).
78.

"When a rule is adopted by the supreme court concerning practice and procedure,

and such rule conflicts with a statute, the rule supersedes the statutory provision." FLA.
STAT. §25.371 (1969).
79.

FLORIDA

LAW

REVISION

COMMISSION,

STUDY

OF CRIMINAL LAW

AND

PROCEDURE

OF

FLORIDA 62 (1970). The First District Court of Appeal has, however, stated in dictum that
the supreme court's powers over practice and procedure are exclusive. State v. O'Steen, 213
So. 2d 751, 753 (Ist D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 221 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1968).
80. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.901-.994; FLA. App. R. 7.2; FLA. R. PROB. & GUiARlA.NSHmP P.
5.610-.710; FLA. R. SUMMARY CLAIMS P. 7.310-.341; FED. R. CpIM. P. (appendix of forms).
81. See FLA. STAT. §§923.09-.20 (1969) (forms for criminal practice).

82. FLA. R. CRm. P. 1.380 (B).
83. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.380 (B) (committee note).
84. STUDY OF CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE OF

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss1/5
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ercise exclusive authority over practice and procedure.8$ However, the continued existence of procedural statutes suggests that the legislature has pro-

cedural authority.86
A judicial determination that procedural statutes remain effective as
court rules87 does not negate the fact that legislative revision of such statutes
implies an affirmative legislative role in the regulation of practice and procedure. If the constitutional rulemaking power of the court is in fact exclusive, such legislative actions may be unconstitutional.
LEGISLATIVE-JUDICIAL CONFLICT OVER THE SCOPE OF RULEMAKING

Considering the undefined nature of procedure and the legislature's role
therein, the absence of serious conflict between the Florida legislature and
the supreme court is significant, A combination of judicial restraint and
legislative deference appear as dominant factors in this absence of conflict.
Judicial Restraint
A statement indicative of the court's general attitude in approaching
encounters with the legislature is found in Holley v. Adams:8 9

[E]very reasonable doubt must be indulged in favor of the act. If it
can be rationally interpreted to harmonize with the Constitution, it
is the duty of the Court to adopt that construction and sustain the act.

One means of avoiding conflict is by construing legislative commands
as directive only. 0 Another approach is illustrated in the court's handling
of who should regulate the constitutional right to bail.91 Existing rules of
procedure control the right to bail in elaborate detail.92 The court's Imple85. Id.
86. Id. at 62.
87. The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provide in part: "All statutes not superseded hereby or in conflict herewith shall remain in effect as rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court." In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 196 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1967).
88. Other jurisdictions have not been quite as fortunate. Numerous cases attest to the
petty and acrimonious nature of some legislative-judidal disputes. E.g., In re Janitor, 35
Wis. 410 (1874) (court, not legislature's delegatee, shall appoint custodian). See generally
McCormick, Legislature and Supreme Court Clash on Rule-Making Power in Colorado, 27
ILL. L. REv. 664 (1933).

89. 288 So. 2d 401, 404 (Fla. 1970).
90. In Simmons v. State, 160 Fla. 626, 36 So. 2d 207 (1948), the supreme court stated
that legislation hampering judicial action is unconstitutional. More importantly, however,
Simmons illustrated the court's reluctance to find possibly procedural statutes unconstitutional. The court avoided reaching the constitutionality of a statute requiring a trial court's
charge to the jury to include the penalty by holding that the statutory "must" meant only
"may" as applied to the trial court. Rich v. Ryals, 212 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1968), utilized an
identical rationale in reversing a Fourth District ruling that a statute providing the court
"shall" issue injunctions against certain zoning violations was unconstitutional.
91. FiA. CoNsr. art. I, §14.
92. See FLA. R. Cum. P. 1.180 (a)- (j). Several other rules collaterally regulate the right
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mentation Committee has determined that the area of bail reform is procedural, 9 3 making it likely that extensive new rules governing bail will be
submitted to the court. Despite these indications that the regulation of bail
is procedural, the court in Green v. State94 recently rejected the argument
that the legislature's denial of bail on appeal, to persons previously convicted
of a felony, 95 was an invasion of judicial powers. In upholding the statute the
court analogized to past legislative "preemption" of judicial discretion in
such areas as the statutory imposition of mandatory sentencing.9 6
If regulation of bail is indeed procedural, 97 the preemption rationale utilized in Greene is difficult to reconcile with the contention that the court's
power over practice and procedure is exclusive.98 The underlying and unarticulated determinant in Greene may be the desire to avoid conflict with
the legislature in the grey area separating practice from substance.
Further evidence of this desire is suggested by A.B.C. Business Forms,
Inc. v. Sparet99 where the court declined, under "ordinary circumstances,"
to hold unconstitutional the application of a statute dictating continuance
of causes where a legislator was a party to the action. Only in "emergency"
situations, such as the one at bar involving irreparable damages, was application of the statute held invalid. 1 °
To say that the court desires to avoid legislative conflict does not mean
it will tolerate all legislative encroachments. Both the separation of powers
clause and the court's constitutional rulemaking authority have been utilized
to strike down legislation. Statutes attempting to legislate such matters as the
weight to be accorded evidencelol and the status of a party- 2 have been regarded as unconstitutional invasions of the court's inherent powers. Statutes
1
and
conflicting with court rules governing disqualification of a judgeO3
waiver of jury trial4 have been labeled procedural and therefore inoperative. Despite occasional invalidation of legislation, however, the overriding
desire for a harmonious relationship with the legislature is demonstrated
to bail. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRaM. P. 1.100, .122, .240.
93. Bennett Interview, supra note 11.
94. 238 So. 2d 296, 299 (Fla. 1970).
95. FLA. STAT. §903.132 (1969).
96. Greene v. State, 238 So. 2d 296, 299 (Fla. 1970). For examples of such legislative
"preemption" see FLA. STAT. §782.04(1) (1969) (sentencing procedures for first degree
murder); FLA. STAT. §794.01 (1969) (sentencing procedures for rape).
97. Legislative repeal of nine statutes regulating the right to bail supports a contention
that bail regulation is procedural. See Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-339, repealing Fla. Stat.
§§903.01, .04, .07, .12, .13, .19, .23, .24, .25 (1969).
98. See State v. O'Steen, 213 So. 2d 751, 753 (1st D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 221 So. 2d
747 (Fla. 1968). See generally text accompanying notes 77-87 supra.
99. 201 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1967).
100. Id. at 892.
101. In re Alkire's Estate, 142 Fla. 862, 198 So. 475 (1940). But see Cooper v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 203 So. 2d 16 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967) (legislature may provide that one fact
may be presumptive of another).
102. Hay v. Isetts, 98 Fla. 1026, 125 So. 237 (1929).
103. State v. Robinson, 132 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 1961).
104. State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1969).
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in Simmons, Holley, and Greene. This attitude, also reflected in lower court
decisions, 0 5 is inversely illustrated by judicial acceptance of legislatively
imposed duties of a non-judicial nature.10 6
Legislative Deference to Judicial Rulemaking
The legislature, as well as the court, manifests a desire to avoid conflict
over rulemaking. It has demonstrated a willinghess to defer to the supreme
court's rulemaking authority since granting the court this authority in
1943.17
Section 25.371 of the 1969 Florida Statutes provides that court adopted
rules shall supersede conflicting statutes. Although the statute and the constitution explicitly limit rulemaking to practice and procedure, the legislature has amended and repealed statutes arguably substantive in nature in
order to avoid conflicts with procedural rules. 1 8 In 1970, for example, the
legislature repealed 207 criminal statutes and amended ffty-two ° 9 A primary reason for this wholesale revision of Florida's criminal law was removal
of statutory provisions conflicting with or superseded by criminal rules.-0
The most recent example of legislative deference to the court's rulemakbig power is the repeal of statutes regulating the right to a speedy trial.Ll1
A defendant's right to discharge where a prompt trial is denied may be substantive.1l 2 Despite the law revision commission's tentative proposal of
eight statutes to govern speedy trials11 3 the legislature in 1971 abdicated its
control in the area to the court.1 4 As amended, the statute contains only an
affirmation of the right to a speedy trial and a statement that such right
shall be determined by court rule.-10

105. See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 237 So. 2d 231 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (issuance
of arrest warrants amenable to legislative regulation); Barton v. State, 193 So. 2d 618 (2d
D.C.A. 1966) (legislative authorization for public defender to summon witness constitutional).
106. A legislative enactment requiring the taking of fingerprints in open court has
been held not to be an unconstitutional imposition of non-judicial duties. Hearns v. State,
228 So. 2d 788, 740 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 899 U.S. 929 (1970).
107. Ha. Laws 1948, ch. 21995, §§1-6.
108. E.g., Fla. Laws 1970, d. 70-889, §87. The comment accompanying this amendment
states: "Although the subject ... is covered by the [Florida] Rules of Criminal Procedure
... it can be argued that this is a substantive right and should be retained as a statute."
109. See Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-839, §§-180. For an analysis of_ the reasons behind this
major revision of criminal law see STUDY OF CRIMINAL LAw Arm PROcEDURE OF FLORIDA,
supra note 79.
110. Interview with Vernon W. Clark, Reporter, Florida Law Revision Commission,
in Gainesville, Fla., Jan. 4, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Clark Interview].
111. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-1 (B), §7, repealing Fla. Stat. §§915.01, .02 (Supp. 1970).
112. See FLORiDA LAW REvjsION CoMMISSION, STATUTES OF LIMrTAnoNs Am SPEEDY TRmAL
4 (Tent. Draft 1970) [hereinafter cited as FLORDA SPEED TRIAL REPORT].
113. Id. at 2.
114. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-1 (B), §6 (2) provides in part: "The Supreme Court shall,

by rule of said court, provide procedures through which the right to a speedy trial ...
shall be realized."
115. Id. FLA. R. Cum. P. 1.191 now regulates the right to a speedy trial in Florida.
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The Potential for Legislative-Judicial Conflict
Legislative deference and judicial restraint notwithstanding, the broadness of the court's rulemaking authority remains a potentially fertile source
of conflict. The catalyst could be provided by judicial implementation of
the ABA Standards,116 many of which contain subjects difficult to categorize
as either substantive or procedural.117
The legislative response to promulgation of rules governing areas such
19
and elecas sentencing alternatives and procedures,118 criminal appeals,
20
deference
legislative
past
Logically,
is
conjectural.
tronic surveillance
reluctance
traditional
court's
the
to
be
attributed
must, at least partially,
to assert its rulemaking authority.' 2' Judicial utilization of rulemaking to
implement marginally substantive standards would involve a break with
tradition, possibly creating a source of conflict with the legislature.
CONCRETE PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE UNDEFINED LIMITS OF RULEMAKING

In addition to creating the potential for legislative-judicial conflict, Florida's implementation of the ABA Standards exposes several practical problems
arising from the unascertained limits of rulemaking. Efforts undertaken by both
22
-with the
the legislature and supreme court to bring Florida into line
2
ABA Standards Relating to Speedy Trial illustrate these problems.' 3
After a study of the speedy trial area the Florida Law Revision Commission, 2 4 a legislative agency, issued recommendations in September 1970
125
Subsequent to this report
for revision of the existing speedy trial statute.
116. Presently 13 standards have been approved by the ABA: Fair Trial-Free Press,
Post-Conviction Remedies, Pleas of Guilty, Appellate Review of Sentences, Speedy Trial,
Providing Defense Services, Joinder and Severence, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures,
Criminal Appeals, Pretrial Release, Trial by Jury, Electronic Surveillance, Discovery and
Procedure Before Trial. Kirshen, Appellate Court Implementation of the Standards for
the Administration of Criminal Justice, 8 Am. CuM. L.Q. 105, 116-17 (1970).
117. Bennett Interview, supra note 11.
118.

Compare ABA STANDARDS RFLATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES

(TenL Draft 1968), with FLA. STAT. ch. 921 (Supp. 1970) (sentencing statute).
119. Compare ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS (Tent. Draft 1969), with
FLA. STAT. ch. 924 (Supp. 1970) (criminal appeal procedure).
120.

Compare ABA STANDARDS

RELATING TO ELECTRONIC

SURVEMLLANcE

(Tent. Draft

1968), with FLA. STAT. ch. 934 (1969) (security of conanunications).
121. See generally text accompanying notes 27-35 supra.
122. Traditionally, the constitutional right to a speedy trial contained in FLA. CoNsr.
art. I, §16, has been implemented by statute. Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19554, §§194, 195. This
statute, however, fell short of the ABA Standards in several respects. See ABA CRIMINAL
LAw SECTION, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NINE APPROVED AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE wrrH FLORIDA STATUTORY LAW, COURT
RULES, AND LEGAL PRACTICE 59-64 (1970). See also Comment, Crowded Dockets No Longer

Justify Denial of Speedy Trial, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 603 (1971).
123.

ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL (Approved Draft 1968).

124. See FLA. STAT. §§13.90-.996 (1969) (authority and duties of the Florida Law Revision Commission).
125. FLORIDA SPEEDY TRIAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 2.
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a committee appointed by the supreme court drafted a proposed speedy
trial rule for the court's consideration.16 Because regulation of the right to
speedy trial may be at the same time substantive and procedural, 2 7 analysis of the work of the Commission and the court's Implementation Committee is profitable. Recent adoption of a speedy trial rule by the court 2s
in no way negates the relevancy of such analysis, for adopted rules are justiciable and subject to constitutional attack.129
The Inadvertant Expansion of Rulemaking
Charged with the responsibility of drafting court rules encompassing
several ABA Standards the court's Implementation Committee had no way
of determining which areas of the ABA's Standards were deemed substantive
or procedural by the ABA committee 30 In its discussion of the constitutional power of the court to govern a given area, the Committee accepted all
existing criminal rules as procedural per se. It then utilized existing rules
as a point of origin in attempting to define the scope of practice and procedure.' 8 1
Clearly, mere adoption does not mean such rules are within the court's
constitutional power. 2 Using existing, untried rules as benchmarks from
which to delineate the breadth of rulemaking may result in unjustifiable
extensions of judicial power; several factors indicate .the unreliability of
using them as a procedural baseline. The drafters of the 1967 Criminal
Rules of Procedure voiced strong doubts as to whether twelve of the subsequently adopted rules were within the scope of rulemaking.3 3 Since the
supreme court's heavy caseload necessarily limits the amount of time spent

126. This committee, established by an unpublished Florida supreme court order, promulgated such a speedy trial rule in 1970. Bennett Interview, supra note 11.
127. It has been asserted that the right to discharge resulting from a denial of
speedy trial is akin to a statute of limitations and therefore substantive. FLOXUDA SPEEDY
TiAL REORT, supra note 112, at 4. The Law Revision Commission's tentative proposal of
8 statutes governing the right to a speedy trial reinforces this contention. See id. at 2.
128. The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended in 1971 to include an
"emergency speedy trial rule." FLA. R. Cum. P. 1.191, In re Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 245 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1971). The court instituted this interim rule in response
to the unexpected legislative repeal of speedy trial statutes. See Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 711(B), §6, repealing Fla. Stat. §918.015 (Supp. 1970) (originally enacted as la. Laws 1939,

ch. 19554, §195).
129. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1969); Williams v. State, 224 So.
2d 406 (Sd D.C.A. Fla. 1969), aff'd, 899 U.S. 78 (1970).
130. Bennett Interview, supra note 11.
131. Id.
132. Nash, Florida Appeal Times, 16 U. Mmsi L. REv. 24, 40 (1961).
133. See Committee notes accompanying FiA. R. Cm. P. 1.230, .270, .350, .510, .570,
.600, .610, .740, .770, .840 (a)(4). Compare In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 196
So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1967) (committee notes and comments are not a part of the formal order
and do not have force of law or court's approval), with State v. Jensen, 895 S.W.2d 143,
145 (Mo. 1965) (notes comparable to legislative reports and should be considered in determining rule's scope and meaning).
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in examining proposed rules,"3 the substantive nature of rules is not really
at issue when they are adopted. 3 5 The problem is further complicated by
the lack of communication between legislative and judicial agencies.13 6 Because of these factors the Committee's utilization of existing rules as procedural guidelines may result in inadvertent expansion of judicial rulemaking into substantive areas.
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES IN DEFINING THE SCOPE OF RULEMAKING

Practical problems, as well as the dangers of potential legislative-judicial conflict arising from uncertainties surrounding the scope of rulemaking,
dictate development of alternatives to ascertain the boundaries of judicial
rulemaking and the legislative role, if any, therein. The substantive right
rationale, by which the court has attempted to solve these problems, has
proved inadequate because it demands the impossible task of defining sub1 37
stance and procedure.
Constitutional Right Rationale
Adoption of a constitutional right approach, as utilized by the Indiana
supreme court in delineating its rulemaking powers, 38 would avoid the
nuances of substantive right terminology when the rule at issue concerns
invocation of a constitutional right in judicial proceedings. The utility of
this approach is indicated by the fact that many of the rights guaranteed by
the Florida Declaration of Rights 39 are presently either directly or collaterally encompassed by existing rules of criminal procedure.- ° Furthermore,
134. Cf. Order of Dec. 26, 1944, 323 U.S. 821, 821-23 (1944) (memorandum of Justice
Frankfurter) (expressing the view the United States Supreme Court would not have time
to regulate procedure). The Florida supreme court's caseload leaves scant room for an indepth examination of whether proposed rules contain substantive interstices. Compare
JUDICIAL CouNcIL OF FLORIDA, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT (1968) (1,469 cases), with
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF FLORIDA, FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT

(1970)

(1,582 cases).

135. Clark Interview, supra note 110.
136. Lack of coordination and communication is a problem evident in the relationship
between the Law Revision Commission and the supreme court's Implementation Committee.
Only after the Revision Commission's speedy trial study and tentative draft were completed
was a liaison conference held between the Commission and the Committee. Interview
with James C. Quarles, Executive Director, Florida Law Revision Commission, in Gainesville, Fla., Feb. 18, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Quarles Interview]. One indication of the
seriousness of this communications failure is that the Commission's reporter was not provided with a copy of the Committee's proposed speedy trial rule and had no idea of the
thrust of the Committee's work or their views as to what aspects of speedy trial regulation
were substantive or procedural. Clark Interview, supra note 110.
137. Cf. Riedl, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-making Power Prescribe
Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 601, 604 (1940).
138. State ex rel. Uzelac v. Lake Criminal Court, 247 Ind. 87, 212 N.E.2d 21 (1965). See
text accompanying notes 65-73 supra.
139. FLA. CONsT. Decl. of Rights §§1-22.
140. E.g., FLA. R. CaIM. P. 1.140 (a) (I) (right to indictment in capital offenses); FLA.
R. CUM. P. 1.140(g) (right to information under oath); FLA. R. CraM. P. 1.191 (right to
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constitutional due process 41 affords a flexible base for the regulation of
practice and procedure.142 The essence of due process, which requires that
43
is the right
a person be duly charged and tried by appropriate procedure,
44
to a procedurally fair trial.
The constitutional right approach is vulnerable to attack, however, since
it may permit excessively broad rulemaking powers. Realistically, the judi45
ciary is the ultimate arbiter of legislation regulating constitutional rights.
It can be argued, therefore, that through rules of court the supreme court
the guidance of lower courts, what it deems
should be able to outline, 4for
6
constitutionally reasonable.
Defining practice and procedure under a constitutional right rationale
would also circumvent the enigmatic substance versus procedure dichotomy
to
utilized in the substantive right approach. It would also allow the court
47
avoid the decisional unpredictability of the substantive right rationale.
Constitutional Amendment of the Court's Rulemaking Authority
More fundamental than difficulties inherent in 'the substantive right approach is the lack of a legislative voice in areas that may possibly be substantive in nature and encompassed by rulemaking. If it is accepted that substance and procedure are not dearly distinguishable, an area labeled
procedural by -the court may contain substantive aspects of legitimate legislative interest.?'4
Various constitutional provisions authorize a legislative voice in judicial
rulemaking. 49 While the constitutional provisions of two states afford statutory superiority over conflicting rules of procedure,- adoption of a similar
provision in Florida would constitute a reversion to direct legislative superspeedy trial); FiA. R. Cum. P. 1.122 (a) (1) (right to be informed of charges); FLA. R. Cram.
P. 1.190(h) (collaterally reaches guarantee against unreasonable search and seizures).
141. FLA. CoNsr. Decl. of-Rights §9.
142. For example, due process has been held to subject state authority to the orderly
course of judicial proceedings enforcing a condemnee's constitutional right to compensation. Spafford v. Brevard County, 92 Fa. 617, 628, 110 So. 451, 455 (1927). See generally
Alloway & Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional Law, 16 U. My~mi L. Rv. 685, 724-31
(1962).
143. Foster v. Perry, 71 Fla. 155, 157, 70 So. 1007 (1916).
144. Capetta v. State, 204 So. 2d 913 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1967), rev'd on other grounds,
216 So. 2d 749 (Na. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1008 (1969).
145. State ex rel. Uzelac v. Lake Criminal Court, 247 Ind. 87, 91, 212 NXE.2d 21, 23
(1965).
146. Id.
147. See Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333,

335 (1932).
148. See Leege v. Martin, 379 P.2d 447, 450 (Alas. 1963). The classical argument for
legislative control over public policy formulation is that legislative bodies, unlike the
judiciary, are democratically oriented and responsive to the citizenry. Bennett & Quade,
The Court as Legislator: A Crucial Symptom, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 92, 105-06 (1965).
149. See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
150. Compare NEB. CoNsr. art. V, §25 (not in conflict with laws governing such matters),
with N.J. CONST. art. VI, §2, 3 (subject tQ law),
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vision of rulemaking, subject to traditional arguments opposing legislative
regulation.'
Other state constitutions allow simple legislative majorities to override
court rules.- 2 The undesirable aspect of these provisions is the possibility
of unintentional, rash, and ill-considered legislative intervention in strictly
procedural matters through a simple majority vote. 15 3 Rather than providing a legislative voice in classification of arguably substantive areas, these
constitutions permit direct legislative control of rulemaking, without assurances that valid legislative interests are involved.154
A unique constitutional approach leaving the court with relatively unfettered rulemaking power, yet providing the legislature with the right of
ultimate review when substantive considerations of public policy become
enmeshed in court rules, has been adopted in Alaska. 5 The Alaska constitution provides: "The supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing . . . practice and procedure . . . . These rules may be changed by
the legislature by two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house."'516
Amendment of the Florida constitution to include a similar legislative
review provision would be useful in several respects. A two-thirds review
provision would avoid ill-considered legislative intervention in judicial rulemaking, yet afford the legislature a voice should rulemaking be extended
into substantive areas involving public policy. 57 Hence, judicial categorization of an area as procedural would not preclude the legislature from protecting its interest in matters of public policy. 158 A legislative review provision
also affords ancillary advantages by inducing intensified judicial attention to
possibly substantive characteristics of proposed rules. 9 Confusion arising
151. The generally stated arguments against legislative regulation of procedure are:
(1) rigidity, (2) lack of legislative expertise in judicial procedure, and (3) needed revisions
may be avoided due to legislative concern with other matters, a lack of interest, or no
organized group supporting procedural change. Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and
Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 U. MrcH. L. Ray. 623, 642-43 (1957).
152. Compare MD. CONsT. art. IV, §18A (until rescinded, changed, or modified by law),
with Mo. CoNsr. art V, §5 (rule may be annulled or amended by a law limited to the
purpose) and OHsO CoNsr. art. IV, §5 (B) (rules effective unless a concurrent resolution of

disapproval adopted).
153. See Leege v. Martin, 379 P.2d 447, 451 (Alas. 1963).
154. See Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 39 (1958).
155. Id. at 37-42.
156. ALAs. CONsr. art. IV, §15.
157. See Leege v. Martin, 379 P.2d 447, 451 (Alas. 1963).
158. "[C]ommentators have recognized that both court and legislature can make necessary contributions towards fair and efficient court procedure: the court can better regulate
the details of rules and change them more easily to fit changing conditions; the legislature
can establish general policy and act as a check upon the court." 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 776, 786
(1968). See also Weinstein, Proposed Revision of New York Civil Practice,60 COLum. L. REv.
50, 52 (1960).
159. Compare Channel Flying, Inc. v. Bernhardt, 451 P.2d 570 (Alas. 1969) (disqualification of a judge held substantive and within legislative powers), with State v. Robinson, 132
So. 2d 156 (Fla. 1961) (statute regulating defendant's right to disqualify judge superseded
by conflicting rule).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss1/5

16

1971]

Earl: The Rulemaking Power of the Florida Supreme Court: The Twilight Z
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT RULEMAKING

POWER

6°
could be avoided by requiring the
from overlapping statutes and rulesW
legislature to specifically denote any statutory intention to affect practice
and procedure. 61
Despite the advantages of constitutionally authorized legislative review
and growing recognition of the soundness of such provisions, 162 adoption
of such an amendment in Florida appears both drastic and improbable. Aside
from the practical difficulties inherent in constitutional amendment,1 63 the
history of rulemaking in New Jersey demonstrates that even constitutional
limitations provide no assurance of protection from the ultimate power
of the judiciary to construe the breadth of rulemaking. In Winberry v. Salisbury'6 the court dealt with the interpretation of New Jersey's constitutional
rulemaking provision, which declared: 165

The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of
all courts . . . and, subject to law, the practice and procedure in all
such courts.
Proceedings of the New Jersey Constitutional Convention reveal that the
phrase "subject to law" was intended to provide the New Jersey legislature
with power to alter or amend judicial rules of procedure. 66 In Winberry,
however, the New Jersey supreme court interpreted the phrase to mean subject to substantive law only. 67 By labeling an area procedural a court can
thereby preclude any legislative voice in rulemaking.
A Mechanism To Clarify the Scope of Rulemaking Within the Existing
Constitutional Framework
A more realistic method of clarifying the scope of rulemaking would be
the creation of an agency to facilitate communication between the legisla-

160. "[In those instances where the subject dealt with is one lying in the grey area
between 'practice and procedure' and substantive law, the rule and the statute have been
In re Wartman's Estate, 128 So. 2d 600,
preserved out of an abundance of caution .
603 (Fla. 1961).
161. See Leege v. Martin, 379 P.2d 447, 451 (Alas. 1963).
162. "[W]e find no observable groundswell for the idea the legislature should be barred
from final competence to regulate court procedure. Rather we find a growing recognition
of the soundness of the policy of vesting comprehensive rule-making power in the courts,
with accountability in the last analysis to the legislature." Kaplan & Green, The Legislature's
Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HAsv. L. Rsv.
234, 251 (1951). "While there has been a general trend . . . towards vesting more rulemaking power in the courts, the trend has not extended to... exclusive power." 43 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 776, 786 (1968).
163. See Levinson, Court of Administrative Appeals: Alternatives Available to Legislature, Following Defeat of 1970 Proposed Amendment of Judiciary Article of Florida Constitution,23 U. FiA. L. REv. 261 (1971).
164. 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950).
165. N.J. CONsT. art. VI, §2, 3 (emphasis added).
166. Levin &Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 25 n.114.
167. 5 N.J. at 266, 74 A.2d at 419.
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ture and the supreme court.168 The need for increased legislative-judicial
communication has been articulated at the federal level 69 and is evident
1 71
in Florida,170 where no such communicatory agency presently exists.
As a conduit between the court and the legislature, the proposed agency
would facilitate and coordinate such joint undertakings as implementation
of ABA Standards. Through coordination, the potential for rulemaking conflict might be reduced.
In addition to its communicative function the proposed agency might
also be assigned the task of developing criteria to allocate "twilight-zone"
jurisdiction between the court and the legislature. Along with the job of
isolating probable points of rulemaking conflict, this might be the most
significant long-range function of the proposed entity. In addition, the
agency might be delegated such specific duties as screening proposed legislation for dearly procedural matters 72 and examining proposed rules for
substantive components. 7 3 It has been suggested that the Law Revision
Commission undertake the screening of proposed statutes. 7 4 While this
function may be within the Commission's statutory authority,"5 the other
duties proposed are not within the Commission's purview nor is the Commis76
sion adequately staffed or funded to perform them.1
The functions to be performed by the proposed entity might best be
undertaken by a newly created independent agency. Since it will be considering both legislative and judicial prerogatives, maximum effectiveness might

168. An analogous but more broadly based device has been proposed by Mr. Chief
Justice Burger: "We should urgently consider a recommendation to Congress to create
a judiciary council . . . to act as a co-ordinating body whose function it would be to
report to the Congress, the President and the Judicial Conference on a wide range of
matters affecting the Judicial branch." Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56
A.B.A.J. 929, 933 (1970).
169. For a discussion of deficiencies in existing modes of communication between the
Supreme Court and Congress see Prettyman, The Chief Justice Should Address Congress,
56 A.B.A.J. 441 (1970).
170. For example, the recently promulgated speedy trial rule came in response to the
"emergency" created by the unanticipated legislative repeal of statutory provisions. See In
re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 245 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1971). Due to this lack of
legislative-judicial communication it was necessary for the court to devote two full days
to hastily drafting an interim rule. Interview with Gerald T. Bennett, Secretary, Supreme
Court Implementation Committee, in Gainesville, Fla., May 5, 1971.
171. Quarles Interview, supra note 136.
172. For a discussion of the need for such a process see FLORMA LAw REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF CRIMINAL LAW AND PRocEuUR
OF FLORIDA 49 (1970).
173. By placing the possibly substantive features of such rules "at issue" before
adoption, the independent examination of proposed rules for substantive traits lessens a court's
analytic burden and reduces the possibility of subsequent litigation over rules. Cf. Hall,
JudicialRule-Making Is Alive But Ailing, 55 A.B.A.J. 637, 638 (1969).
174. FLORIDA LAw REvIsION COMMISSION, supra note 172, at 49.
175. Quarles Interview, supra note 136. The Commission is statutorily empowered
to: "[E]xercise all other powers, duties and functions necessary or convenient for properly
carrying out provisions of this law and all other laws relating to the [Commission's functions] ....
" FLA. STAT. §11.242(10) (Supp. 1970).
176. Quarles Interview, supra note 136.
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be attained if the agency were composed equally of both legislative and judicial appointees.1 77 The agency or committee suggested in this proposal
need not be expensive nor structurally elaborate. Its structure might be
based upon a compact, full-time research staff guided by the directives of a
part-time committee of judicial and legislative appointees.
CONCLUSION

The rulemaking authority of the Florida supreme court represents the
culmination of the movement away from legislative control over judicial procedure. Past reforms realized through this power and its potential for future
8
reform should not be denied or curtailedy.1
Only when judicial rulemaking
encompasses matters not distinctly procedural must the latitude of the supreme court's rulemaking authority be questioned.
The substantive right rationale, because of its conclusory nature, should
not be employed to ascertain the scope of rulemaking when the rule at issue
may involve valid legislative interests. Although the constitutional right
rationale may prove a more predictable determinant of procedural boundaries, it too may result in overly broad procedural definitions.
Within the existing constitutional framework the most feasible means
of ascertaining rulemaking limitations appears to be the creation of a joint
legislative-judicial agency. In-depth exploration of rulemaking by such a
body would recognize the inherent difficulty in distinguishing the procedural
domain of the court from the substantive realm of the legislature. Facilitation of communication between the legislature and the court would greatly
enhance cooperation between two coordinate branches of government in an
area of sometimes overlapping interests79
WILLIAM

L. EARL

177. The executive branch might also be represented. The Federal Judiciary Council
proposed by Chief Justice Burger would consist of six members: two would be appointed
by Congress, two by the Judicial Conference, and two by the President. Burger, supra note
168, at 933. The executive branch, through its enforcement powers, plays a role in judicial
procedure. The inclusion of one appointee from the executive branch in the proposed
Florida agency, therefore, would not only represent that interest but would eliminate the
possibility of a deadlock within the agency.
178. "At an earlier day reform in the law was usually at the instance of outraged laymen, and accomplished by them over the objections of the legal profession. It is one of the
glories of the present reform movement that this has not been true, and that the profession
has understood the need for change and been willing to bear the burden of instigating
change."

I

W. BARRON & A. HoLTzoFF, FED.RAL PRACrICE AND PRoCEDURE §10 (1960).

179. "The concept of separation of powers, which divide our state government into
three branches, does not establish a distinct line of demarcation. Rather, the successful
functioning of the system demands some overlapping of functions and cooperation between
the branches." Nash, Florida Appeal' Times, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 24, 41 (1961).
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